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Policy 
pointers
Forced evictions in 
response to disasters 
must stop. They are 
counterproductive and 
undermine people’s 
agency and trust, and 
exacerbate inequality.
Humanitarian and 
development practitioners, 
including government 
officials planning 
relocations, must work 
with the disaster-affected 
communities from the 
outset, allowing time to 
manage the physical, 
economic and 
psychological impacts. 
Local and state 
government should help 
communities and local 
NGOs do preventative 
assessments before 
disasters strike, and help 
communities learn about 
risk reduction and disaster 
management. Both 
government and 
nongovernmental 
organisations should make 
shared learning part of 
their institutional structure, 
to avoid creating or 
exacerbating risk.
All state and local 
government departments 
must start risk-proofing 
their development agenda. 
Disaster management and 
risk reduction cannot be 
done reactively.
Rethinking post-disaster 
relocation in urban India
After natural disasters, governments often relocate vulnerable urban 
communities in the name of humanitarian relief. But urban communities 
rarely welcome such relocation, since it frequently exacerbates their daily 
challenges or creates new risks. Indeed, resettlement after a disaster is 
often another form of eviction. This briefing discusses the situation in 
Chennai, where state and local authorities have been building resettlement 
tenements on inland marsh areas using centrally sponsored schemes for 
affordable housing. These have been used as a ‘quick fix’ after disasters, but 
without addressing communities’ underlying needs and inequalities. Their 
siting has also increased flood risk across the urban area, creating new 
risks. Instead, India should develop participatory and risk-reducing plans 
and policies for relocation, and also help vulnerable communities address 
the risks where they currently live. This briefing is part of the project ‘Long-
term implications of humanitarian responses: a case of Chennai’. The 
research was conducted in 2016 by the Indian Institute for Human 
Settlements (IIHS) and Madras Institute for Development Studies (MIDS).1
Poor development is disaster 
prone
Everyone lives with a certain amount of risk in 
their daily lives, but inequitable urbanisation 
processes exacerbate some people’s 
vulnerabilities and often leave many with very 
limited access to resources needed to cope with, 
and adapt to, challenging conditions (such as 
land, housing, basic services, viable job 
opportunities, and education and health facilities). 
It is these vulnerable communities who end up 
living in otherwise undesirable risk-prone informal 
settlements and slums. Living in such areas, 
where daily risks such as disease exposure 
already make residents more vulnerable, can 
have far-reaching implications and be disastrous 
for poor communities when a natural hazard 
strikes. Unplanned growth in environmentally 
fragile locations leads to further inequalities and 
poor development outcomes, and worsens the 
risks of disasters in urban areas.
Relocation as a response and not 
long-term recovery
In India, the humanitarian response immediately 
after a disaster often also involves moving people 
away from risk-prone settlements by local 
development authorities. Rehabilitation must be 
undertaken as part of a long-term recovery 
process following detailed socio-economic and 
risk assessments with relevant monitoring 
frameworks in place. But undertaking 
resettlement within a short time after the disaster 
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is unable to address the underlying inequalities or 
vulnerabilities that may have caused the losses. 
Rather, relocation after disasters, especially if 
residents are rushed and put under pressure, can 
make things worse. 
Humanitarian responses 
by many other actors, 
including NGOs and 
international agencies, is 
limited to distribution of 
aid, food and other emergency and temporary 
shelters following the disasters. These actors 
have limited power to intervene in relocation 
decisions and provide aid to communities only 
until they are moved. It is observed that once 
relocated, communities are ignored in the future 
by humanitarian actors as well.
Relocation: eviction by another 
name
People who have developed communities in 
risk-prone areas often want to continue living 
there so they can maintain their access to 
livelihood options, to social and physical 
infrastructure, to environmental resources, and 
also so they can exercise their political ‘agency’ 
and make their collective voice heard. But while 
such people resist relocation before any 
disaster has happened, they often give in to 
moving after one. 
This is sometimes because they better 
appreciate the risks they live with, but often also 
because they have no alternate choice during 
the crisis. Moving people soon after a disaster, 
when they have no choice over where to live, is 
often against their clearly established will and is 
another form of eviction. 
No legal framework
India has legal frameworks and compensation 
mechanisms covering people who have to 
relocate because their land has been acquired 
for development. But there are no such 
frameworks in place for those who are 
displaced after or by a disaster. Often, these 
people have no legal title or security of tenure 
over their land. Where state governments 
provide compensation, it is because of a sense 
of moral responsibility rather than any legal 
requirement and the amounts vary widely 
across the country. When government provides 
housing in such circumstances, it generally 
considers it is occupying the ‘moral high 
ground’. There is no recognition that relocation 
can have many detrimental outcomes for 
disaster-affected communities. 
Often, government agencies identify ‘slums’ as 
‘untenable’2 because of their hazardous 
locations. An ‘untenable slum’ could be around a 
major storm water drain (or other major drain); 
along railway lines or in areas where government 
wants to align major transport hubs or links; 
along river banks or water bodies (or within 
stream beds); or they may have other hazards, 
such as high-tension electricity lines close by. If 
an agency decides a slum is ‘untenable’, that can 
be considered enough justification to force 
people to relocate. Again, these vulnerable and 
disadvantaged communities are usually given 
very limited options for their risk reduction. The 
decision-making processes for identifying 
‘untenable slums’ does not involve the identified 
communities, does not usually recognise their 
capacities to cope with everyday risks, and 
alternative locations are rarely assessed or even 
made available. 
Prior development agenda
State and local government departments take 
many decisions on relocation (including decisions 
on location, size and quality of housing, provision 
of physical and other infrastructure, and so on). 
These are made in line with existing development 
agendas or planning visions prior to any 
occurrence of a disaster, and tend to ignore 
exposure to environmental and hazard risks. 
Communities often contest and resist these 
wider plans, but disasters skew the power 
dynamics and give government authorities an 
opportunity to push ahead. Forcing the issue 
when people have limited power to resist may be 
at one with developmental aims, but may increase 
everyday socio-economic risks for the people and 
therefore not reduce the risks communities face. 
Ready-made post-disaster relocation sites. 
Governments also often respond to disasters by 
allocating housing that has already been built 
under development programmes. Much of it has 
been built using national or state housing 
programme funds designed to fill the gaps in 
affordable housing supply. In principle, having a 
government that is prepared with housing (and 
other provisions) could help disaster-affected 
communities in their time of crisis. But since the 
beneficiaries are only identified much after the 
housing is built, there are always gaps between 
people’s specific needs and what the housing 
provides. For example, urban fishers making their 
living from the coast cannot easily move inland. 
Crucially, local governments don’t do enough to 
assess vulnerability, risks and needs before 
disasters strike. Better assessments could help 
build risk-proof and viable housing, whether at the 
original location or at a suitable alternative that is 
acceptable to the affected communities. 
Resettled but still marginalised. Housing 
provided for relocated communities is usually far 
Better assessments could 
help build risk-proof and 
viable housing
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from the city centre, because that’s where 
affordable vacant land is available for 
development. Such sites may have significant 
developmental shortcomings. For example, they 
may lack sufficient physical and social 
infrastructure (such as public transport and 
schools) or they may be far from people’s normal 
jobs and also lack other livelihood opportunities. 
But once people are sheltered in new housing, 
the disaster is considered to be ‘dealt with’ and 
other needs are met irregularly, slowly or not at all. 
Resettlement sites are also frequently ignored 
when government agencies consider further 
disaster preparedness planning or distribute 
disaster relief. Yet their residents face greater 
everyday life challenges. Unless resettled people 
are given formal tenure within housing policies, 
relocation programmes leave the poor at 
continuing risk of evictions. 
City-level environmental issues. Both 
post-disaster and development housing 
programmes often ignore environmental 
problems at new resettlement locations. As 
discussed in Box 1, affordable housing is primarily 
built on otherwise unusable land and this can 
have long-term environmental implications for 
cities. Housing programmes in India do not follow 
any monitoring and evaluation frameworks that 
could reveal the long-term implications of such 
choices for people and their communities. 
Recommendations
Local governments should avoid creating or 
exacerbating risk by learning from past 
interventions. It is crucial that both state and 
local government departments develop flexible 
and multi-stakeholder processes to monitor and 
evaluate past interventions (both post-disaster 
and development-related programmes) to avoid 
repeating past mistakes. 
Both government and nongovernmental 
organisations should make shared learning 
on past relocation programmes a part of 
their institutional structure. This would facilitate 
learning from one project to the next, help share 
and embed best practices, and leverage the 
strengths of both kinds of organisation. 
Development authorities and humanitarian 
workers planning relocation or rehabilitation 
programmes must work with the 
communities affected. Community-led 
assessments are needed, in partnership with local 
NGOs. This helps recognise the real risks faced 
by communities and stop relocation programmes 
that accumulate, or create new, risks. 
All government departments, especially for 
housing, land and disaster management, 
must build multi-stakeholder engagement 
into development decision making. This is 
crucial to managing the many growing, and often 
conflicting, demands in urban areas. Key 
stakeholders such as real estate developers and 
the private sector need to be especially included.
Government should support participatory 
platforms that can conduct preventative 
assessments before disasters strike. 
Vulnerability and impact assessments are crucial 
to managing disaster risk and must be done 
before crises arise. Good vulnerability and impact 
assessments will guide actions to build resilience 
for short-, medium- and long-term time frames. 
The assessments must:
 • Explore how risk changes with geographical 
scales and over time 
 • Assess the social, psychological, economic 
and political impacts people are likely to suffer 
Box 1. Resettlement sites in Chennai are creating 
long-term environmental risks
Since 2000, the Government of Tamil Nadu (GoTN) has built over 50,000 
resettlement tenements in the southern outskirts of Chennai alone. 
Although the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission’s 
(JNNURM’s) policy guidelines advocated in situ slum upgrading as the 
preferred approach, GoTN has spent almost 80 per cent of funds received 
under the JNNURM Basic Services for the Urban Poor programme on 
building resettlement tenements on urban peripheries, mostly on lands 
reclaimed from marshlands and floodplains.3 
The resettlement tenements include many built in Kannagi Nagar, 
Perumbakkam and Semmencherry. These sites are located on a very 
low-lying Pallikaranai marshland (see Figure 1). By late 2015, many of these 
housing units were lying vacant, awaiting eviction of slum dwellers from the 
city. This forms the backdrop for the resettlement drives that have routinely 
followed disasters in Chennai, including post-tsunami in 2005 and post-
floods in 2015.
Kannagi Nagar is built on the Pallikaranai marsh along the outlet at 
Okkiyam Maduvu (a narrow drainage channel that connects the marsh with 
the Buckingham Canal, from where it goes into the sea). Semmencherry 
and Perumbakkam are built on low-lying marsh that plays a very important 
environmental role and provides natural drainage.4 It takes surface water 
runoff not just for the city, but also the larger region. These settlements, 
along with the other development in the marshland, have increased its 
imperviousness, raised surface runoff volumes and affected the local 
drainage network. The tenements built on the low-lying areas and wetlands 
suffer frequent flooding. The Chennai master plan also identifies that other 
built-up areas in the watershed region get flooded during monsoons.5 
Over the past 50 years, nearly 90 per cent of the Pallikaranai Marsh has 
been lost, and areas such as Thoraipakkam, Pallikaranai and Perungudi 
have been converted into residential areas. Roads, infrastructure, municipal 
landfills, sewage treatment facilities and so on have also taken their toll on 
the overall natural drainage pattern.4 It is these building activities that have 
led to the frequent flooding in and around the marshland and across many 
now built-up areas.6
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from disasters, as well as the likely damage to 
the systems they rely on — for example, 
access to institutions and infrastructure 
 • Consider the city more broadly, for example 
assess environmental risks and explore how 
risks affect communities differently (the 
equity implications)
 • Go beyond developing a technical 
understanding of vulnerability and actually 
develop goals for sustainability (socio-
economic and ecological) and equity (across 
different urban communities).
Local government and other humanitarian 
actors should fund and promote ways to 
help communities learn about risk 
reduction and disaster management. This is 
central to building local capacities and 
capabilities that will make communities more 
resilient and make relief efforts more effective.
State government must start actively 
risk-proofing their development agenda. 
Disaster management and risk reduction cannot 
be done reactively. For long-term resilience, the 
state government must develop a roadmap and 
build capacity that will help ‘risk-proof’ the 
development agenda, and move away from 
ad-hoc rehabilitation and the vulnerability it 
brings. A risk-proofing mindset focuses on 
making climate compatibility a mainstream part 
of ongoing development initiatives, for example 
building climate-sensitive housing as standard or 
disincentivising encroachment into urban green 
spaces that could have long-term environmental 
implications for the city and region.
Forced evictions in response to disasters 
must stop. Our final, and perhaps strongest, 
recommendation is that forced evictions of 
residents from informal settlements should be 
banned. They are counterproductive because 
they undermine people’s ability to act for 
themselves (undermining their ‘agency’), they 
erode trust and exacerbate inequality. If 
preventive and participatory vulnerability 
assessments are undertaken as routine 
government processes, these can identify 
settlements to be relocated and give residents 
enough notice to manage the physical, 
economic and psychological impacts. Thus, 
relocation can be done as part of a long-term 
recovery process in a dignified, mutually agreed 
and risk-reducing way rather than as a crude 
reaction to disasters.
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Figure 1. Locations of resettlement 
sites in low-lying areas of the city. 
These sites are also over 30 kilometres 
away from the original settlement 
locations. 
